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Abstract 
 
Interpersonal pain perception is a fundamental and evolutionarily beneficial social 
process. While critical for navigating the social world, whether or not people rely on similar 
processes to perceive and respond to the harm of the non-human biological world remains 
largely unknown. Here we investigate whether neural reactivity toward the suffering of other 
people is distinct from or overlapping with the neural response to pain and harm inflicted upon 
non-human entities, specifically animals and nature. We used fMRI to measure neural activity 
while participants (n=15) perceived and reported how badly they felt for the pain or harm of 
humans, animals, and nature, relative to neutral situations.  Neural regions associated with 
perceiving the pain of other people (e.g. dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, bilateral anterior insula) 
were similarly recruited when perceiving and responding to painful scenes across people, 
animals, and nature.  These results suggest that similar brain responses are relied upon when 
perceiving the harm of social and non-social biological entities, broadly construed, and that 
activity within the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and bilateral anterior insula in response to 
pain-relevant stimuli is not uniquely specific to human targets. 
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1 Introduction 
Around the world, people donate hundreds of billions of dollars each year to regional and 
international charities ranging from the American Red Cross and Doctors without Borders to the 
Nature Conservancy and World Wildlife Fund (Charities Aid Foundation, 2011).  While a 
majority of donations fund efforts to directly relieve human suffering, people also routinely fund 
efforts to relieve non-human harm and suffering, such as animal rescue and nature conservation.  
Evolutionary psychologists have long argued that altruistic acts such as charitable donation 
emerge from the fundamental capacity for people to perceive and feel the suffering of others and 
act to alleviate that suffering (i.e., perception-action model of empathy, Preston & de Waal, 
2002).   
A core network of brain regions underlies the recognition and interpretation of the pain of 
others (e.g. meta-analyses by Fan, Duncan, Greck & Northoff, 2011 and Lamm, Decety, & 
Singer, 2011). Specifically, the dorsal anterior cingulate (dACC) and bilateral anterior insular 
(AI) cortices are recruited when perceiving the pain of others across diverse contexts, such as 
physical pain or injury (Jackson, Rainville, & Decety, 2006; Lamm, Nusbaum, Meltzoff, & 
Decety, 2007; Singer et al., 2004; Zaki, Ochsner, Hanelin, Wager, & Mackey, 2007), painful 
facial expressions (Botvinick et al., 2005; Saarela, Hlushchuk, Williams, Schurmann, Kalso, & 
Hari, 2007), social pain of exclusion (Masten, Morelli, & Eisenberger, 2011), and complex 
emotional pain (Cheon et al., 2011; Chiao, Mathur, Harada, Lipke, 2009; Mathur, Harada, Lipke, 
& Chiao, 2010). Although numerous prior studies have demonstrated and described the neural 
basis of the perception of human suffering, the specificity of the responding of this system is not 
well understood.  Given the prevalence of costly helping behaviors directed to relieve the pain or 
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harm of animals and nature, the neural processes recruited to perceive and respond to such non-
human targets are of particular interest.  
Environmental preservation campaigns often rely upon a bidirectional relationship 
between empathy and anthropomorphism, the human tendency to attribute agency or human 
characteristics (e.g., emotions and motivation) to non-human targets (Epley, Waytz, Cacioppo, 
2007; Herrmann, Waxman, Medin, 2010).  One such campaign asked “If your mother were 
Texas, would you still litter?” (Texas Department of Transportation, 2001).  Similarly, animal 
protection agencies often show hurt animals in advertisements to motivate helping behavior and 
financial giving (e.g. The Humane Society of the United States, 2011). Prior behavioral research 
suggests that people perceive pain among, and feel empathy for, physically and emotionally hurt 
animals (Phillips, 2009; Schultz, 2000). Given the human propensity to empathize with non-
human entities, such as animals and nature, one hypothesis is that perception of pain and 
suffering may rely on a shared neural network across both human and non-human entities. 
Supporting this hypothesis, the one study to examine neural response to the pain of a non-human 
target (i.e., dogs) found overlapping neural response within the dACC and bilateral AI while 
passively viewing the pain of dogs and humans (Franklin et al., 2013). 
 On the other hand, prior evidence suggests that neural processing of the pain of other 
people may be distinct from processing the pain or harm of animals or the natural environment. 
For instance, people recruit different brain areas when visually processing and making inferences 
about other people relative to when making similar inferences about non-human events 
(Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2005; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003).  Individual differences in trait 
empathy have also been associated with activity in social cognitive brain regions when viewing 
human, but not non-human, natural scenes (Wagner, Kelley, & Heatherton, 2011). Therefore, 
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human perception of the pain of other people may rely upon a distinct network of brain regions 
compared to the perception of pain or harm of animals or the environment. 
 A third possibility is that neural processing of the pain or harm of human and non-human 
entities relies on the same neural regions, but to differing extents within these regions. 
Supporting this view, prior behavioral and psychophysiological evidence shows that people 
display greater empathic and physiological reactivity for pain of animals that are 
phylogenetically closer to humans (Rae Westbury & Neumann, 2008). Furthermore, strength of 
belief that animals have mental capacity (and therefore may be more similar to humans) 
correlates with self-reported empathy for animals (Hills, 1995).  Schultz (2001) suggested that 
empathic concern for the environment varies across individuals to the extent that they include 
and integrate the natural environment as part of the self.  When people were instructed to take the 
perspective of animals being harmed by pollution in the environment, they subsequently reported 
greater empathy for the natural environment relative to people who objectively viewed the same 
scenes (Schultz, 2000). Consequently, people may exhibit differential psychological and neural 
responses when encountering pain or harm inflicted upon human relative to various non-human 
targets (i.e. animals or the environment) to the extent that they perceive the targets to be similar 
to themselves.  Perceived similarity and degree of identification with a human target has also 
been shown to modulate neural responses underlying pain perception and empathy (Decety, 
Echols, & Correll, 2010; Mathur, Harada, & Chiao, 2012).  One study found that when viewing 
and perceiving the pain of racial ingroup, relative to outgroup, targets in pain, Chinese and 
Caucasian participants show increased neural activity in the dACC and left frontal cortex (Xu, 
Zuo, Wang, & Han, 2009). However, other studies have found no difference in dACC and AI 
activity in response to the emotional pain of racial ingroup, relative to outgroup, people among 
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Caucasian and African Americans (Mathur et al., 2010) and native Koreans and Caucasian 
Americans (Cheon, et al., 2011). Taken together, the above evidence suggests that neural 
processing associated with pain perception may be expected to differ between human and non-
human entities due to variations in characteristics such as humanness, perceived agency, 
phylogenetic similarity, as well as the degree to which perceivers identify with the target.  This 
alternative hypothesis would be supported by results demonstrating different levels of reactivity 
in pain processing regions, in response to the pain or harm of humans, animals, and nature. 
In addition to our main hypotheses, this study was also motivated by an interest in the 
flexibility and specificity of dACC and AI reactivity in the context of perceiving pain or harm1.  
Determining whether dACC and AI reactivity extends to the perception of harm inflicted on non-
human targets that may not have subjective experiences (i.e. nature) may elucidate whether 
dACC and AI activity during pain perception reflects empathic resonance with the subjective 
experience of the pain of another, or suggest this activity may instead subserve a broader 
psychological process in response pain or harm perception itself. If dACC and AI reactivity is 
exclusively observed in response to the suffering of human targets, but not for non-human 
targets, then activity within dACC and AI may be reflecting processes that are specific to 
interpersonal and social contexts rather than a reflection of pain-relevant processing. Yet, if 
dACC and AI reactivity is broadly observed in response to the suffering of all targets, then this 
activity may subserve broader processes of pain or harm perception itself. Given the broad 
functions associated with the AI and dACC across social, physiological, and emotional 
processes, this information would be critical for specifying the AI and dACC’s potential role in 
empathic and pain-relevant processing. 
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 To test these hypotheses, we investigated whether distinct or shared neural circuitry is 
recruited when empathizing with people, animals, and nature in either painful or neutral 
scenarios, and whether degree of neural reactivity varies as a function of target group. Here, we 
use the term empathy to refer to the subjective affective response and underlying neural response 
assessed while participants viewed pictures of the pain or harm of people, animals, or nature, and 
rated “How badly [they felt]” for each target.   
 
2 Methods 
2.1 Participants 
Fifteen right-handed Caucasian volunteers (8 female, M = 25.3 years, SE = 4.7), with 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated in this study, and were compensated $25 per 
hour of their time. All participants were healthy: free from chronic illness (including 
neurological, psychiatric, or substance-abuse conditions) and medications that alter blood flow or 
brain function. This study was approved by the Northwestern University Institutional Review 
Board, and informed written consent was obtained from each participant prior to the experiment. 
2.2 Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted of naturalistic visual scenes (640 pixels x 480 pixels) depicting people 
(Caucasian Americans), animals (various farm animals), or nature (plant life and natural 
waterways) under egregiously negative (e.g. people in the midst of a natural disaster such as a 
hurricane, injured or sick animals, deforestation or pollution) or neutral conditions (Figure 1). 
Twenty-four unique scenes were included for each of the six conditions (People Pain2, People 
Neutral, Animals Pain, Animals Neutral, Nature Pain, and Nature Neutral). 
2.2.1 Stimuli validation 
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In a separate stimuli validation study (results presented in Table 1), 27 participants (20 
female, M = 23.4 years, SE = 0.72) rated degree of perceived pain (How much pain do you think 
[this person, this animal, nature] is in?), level of perceived agency (How much control do you 
think [this person, this animal, nature] has over this situation?), and empathy felt (How badly do 
you feel for [this person, this animal, nature]?) for the person, animal, or nature in each scenario 
using an 8-point Likert scale (0 = not at all to 7 = very much).   
2.2.1.1 Perceived pain 
 Results from a 2 (valence of experience: Pain, Neutral) x 3 (target group: People, 
Animals, Nature) analysis of variance revealed a main effect of target group (People, Animals, or 
Nature), F(2, 52) = 3.38, p= 0.04, and a main effect of valence, F(1, 26) = 679.23, p< 0.001, on 
perceived pain ratings.  People [t (26) = 25.66, p < 0.001, d = 5.65], animals [t (26) = 18.00, p < 
0.001, d = 4.26], and nature [t (26) = 17.35, p < 0.001, d = 4.11] were perceived as in 
significantly more pain in the Pain relative to the Neutral scenes.  There was no significant 
interaction between target group and valence. 
2.2.1.2 Perceived agency 
 Results from a 2 (valence of experience: Pain, Neutral) x 3 (target group: People, 
Animals, Nature) analysis of variance on perceived target agency ratings revealed main effects of 
target group F(2, 52) = 66.24, p< 0.001, and valence F(1, 26) = 8.30, p= 0.008, and a significant 
interaction between group and valence, F(2, 52) = 29.77, p< 0.001.  Both people and animals in 
pain were seen as having decreased agency (less power or control over their situation) than 
people and animals in neutral conditions [People: t (26) = - 4.94, p < 0.001, d = -1.08; Animals: t 
(26) = - 2.23, p = 0.04, d = -0.57].  There was no significant difference in agency ratings between 
Pain and Neutral nature scenes (p > 0.05). 
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2.2.1.3 Evoked empathy 
 Correspondingly, there were main effects of target group (People, Animals, or Nature), 
F(2, 52) = 32.94, p < 0.001, and valence, F(1, 26) = 882.19, p < 0.001, on empathy ratings and a 
significant interaction between target group and valence F(2, 52) = 6.37, p = 0.003, such that 
participants reported increased relative empathy (Pain – Neutral) toward animals compared to 
people [t (26) = 2.18, p = 0.04, d = 0.59] and nature [t (26) = 2.92, p = 0.007, d = 0.81], and 
participants reported increased empathy across domains toward pain relative to neutral 
conditions [People: t (26) = 22.73, p < 0.001, d = 4.99; Animals: t (26) = 33.19, p < 0.001, d = 
5.67; Nature: t (26) = 14.58, p < 0.001, d = 3.54], (Table 1).  There was no significant difference 
in relative empathy ratings toward people and nature (p > 0.05). 
2.2.1.4 Validation study conclusion  
People and animals in Pain were seen as having less control over their situation (agency), 
than corresponding Neutral targets. As intended, targets in Pain stimuli were perceived to be in 
more pain than targets in Neutral stimuli, across target types. Accordingly, participants reported 
feeling worse (greater empathy) for targets in the Pain, relative to Neutral, stimuli, across target 
types (Table 1). We concluded that all Pain stimuli were seen as more painful than Neutral 
stimuli, and effectively evoked an affective response among participants. 
 Despite reporting perceiving pain and feeling badly for nature in Pain scenes, participants 
did not find nature in Pain more agentic than nature in Neutral scenes, suggesting that 
participants were not personifying nature. Though we did not asses directly personification or 
anthropomorphism, this result suggests that participants’ empathy ratings are not necessarily 
dependent upon humanizing the non-human targets.  
2.3 Design 
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We employed a block design consisting of six types of task blocks depicting people, 
animals, or nature in pain or neutral scenarios. There were four blocks per task type. Each block 
consisted of six unique trials of that block type. Two presentation sequences were created and 
participants were randomly assigned to a sequence order at the time of scheduling. Within each 
of these sequences, task blocks were displayed in a fixed random order. There were no 
differences in any outcome variables based on sequence order. Additionally, task blocks were 
separated by control blocks during which participants pressed a button with their right index 
finger when a simple gray square appeared. These control blocks were not included as a contrast 
of interest in the subsequent analyses. For each trial, a complex visual scene or a gray square was 
displayed for 2500ms, followed by a black screen for 500ms. 
For the current study we modified a block design which successfully induced empathic 
neural responses to the emotional suffering of other people (Mathur et al., 2010). We chose a 
block-design as they are generally more sensitive to the detection of relatively activated areas 
(e.g. areas more active in response to people vs. animals) and more statistically powerful than 
event-related designs (Amaro & Barker, 2006; Birn, Cox, & Bandettini, 2002).  
2.4 Procedure 
During scanning, participants responded to the question “How badly do you feel for the 
[person, animal, environment] in this scene?” on a four-point Likert scale (1 = not at all to 4 = 
very much) using the corresponding number of button presses.  This question has been used in 
prior studies examining empathy and neural empathic processes in response to the pain of other 
people (e.g. Mathur et al., 2010). This question was chosen to assess an affective response to the 
pain or harm of the targets. We refer to this process as empathy in the current paper, but note that 
participants were not instructed to perspective take, anthropomorphize, or ascribe feeling states 
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to the targets, but rather report their own subjective response toward each target. Participants 
were instructed to give their gut response rapidly upon seeing each scene.  Prior to entering the 
scanner, participants were shown example scenes and given a practice trial in order to become 
familiar with the task.  
Outside of the scanner, all participants were asked to complete the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI), as a measure of trait empathy (Davis, 1980). 
2.5 Behavioral statistical analysis 
To determine if pain and target group affected on online empathy ratings and response 
reaction time, 2 (valence of experience: Pain, Neutral) x 3 (target group: People, Animals, 
Nature) repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted. 
To determine the relationship between empathy felt for people, animals, and nature, 
Pearson correlation analysis was conducted on these ratings. 
2.6 Imaging parameters 
Functional whole-brain images were acquired using a 3T Siemens Trio at the Center for 
Advanced Magnetic Resonance Imaging (CAMRI) facility located at the Northwestern 
University Medical School in Chicago, IL, USA. We acquired functional images by using T2*- 
weighted, gradient echo, echo planar imaging sequences [repetition time (TR) = 2000 ms; echo 
time (TE) = 25ms; flip angle = 70º; FOV =20 cm, 64 x 64 matrix; 34 slices; 4mm slice thickness 
(no gap); in-plane resolution = 3.0 x 3.0 mm]. A high-resolution anatomical T1-weighted image 
was also acquired [TR = 2300ms; TE = 2.91ms; flip angle = 9°; FOV = 256mm; 256 x 256 
matrix; 160 slices; voxel size = 1.0 x 1.0 x 1.0 mm] for each participant. All stimuli were 
presented using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA) and projected 
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onto a half-transparent viewing screen located behind the head coil. Participants viewed the 
stimuli using a tilted mirror attached to the head coil. 
2.7 Imaging processing and statistical analysis 
Functional images were analyzed using SPM2 software (Wellcome Department of 
Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK) implemented in Matlab (Mathworks, Cherborn, MA, 
USA). The first 6 volumes were discarded due to unsteady magnetization, and all of the 
remaining volumes were realigned spatially to the first volume and a mean image was created. 
After a high-resolution image was coregistered onto the mean image, all volumes were 
normalized to the MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute) space using a transformation matrix 
obtained from the normalization process of the high-resolution image of each individual 
participant to the MNI template. The normalized images were then spatially smoothed with an 
8mm Gaussian kernel. 
After preprocessing, statistical analysis for each individual participant was conducted 
using the general linear model (Friston et al., 1994). At the first level, each block of trials was 
modeled by convolving with a hemodynamic response function. For each participant, a linear 
regressor was applied to filter noise. In the subtraction analysis, 6 task conditions [People Pain, 
People Neutral, Animals Pain, Animals Neutral, Nature Pain, and Nature Neutral] were modeled 
separately, including fixation. Random effects analyses were conducted by averaging the 
contrast images for each effect of interest.  
To identify the main effect of pain, whole-brain voxel-wise analyses were performed 
across target groups (People, Animals, Nature) on the simple contrast [Pain > Neutral] with a 
threshold of p < 0.05 (FWE corrected), extant threshold = 10 voxels (Table 3), and within target 
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groups with a threshold of p < 0.005 (FDR corrected), extant threshold = 10 voxels (Tables 4-6, 
Figure 1).   
To identify the main effect of target group on neural activity, and identify differences in 
neural response to people, animals, and nature, independent of valence of experience, a whole-
brain voxel-wise analysis was performed on the simple contrasts [People (Pain + Neutral) > Animals 
(Pain + Neutral)], [People (Pain + Neutral) > Nature (Pain + Neutral)], [Animals (Pain + Neutral) > Nature (Pain + 
Neutral)] (Table S1), [Animals (Pain + Neutral) > People (Pain + Neutral)], [Nature (Pain + Neutral) > Animals (Pain 
+ Neutral)], [Nature (Pain + Neutral) > People (Pain + Neutral)], with a threshold of p < 0.005 (FDR 
corrected), extant threshold = 10 voxels.  
Whole-brain voxel-wise analyses were also performed to identify possible pain by target 
group interactions in neural activity that would suggest differential neural response to pain or 
harm, relative to neutral situations, depending on target type [People (Pain - Neutral) > Animals (Pain - 
Neutral)], [People (Pain - Neutral) > Nature (Pain - Neutral)], [Animals (Pain - Neutral) > Nature (Pain - Neutral)], 
[Animals (Pain - Neutral) > People (Pain - Neutral)], [Nature (Pain - Neutral) > Animals (Pain - Neutral)], [Nature 
(Pain - Neutral) > People (Pain - Neutral)], with a threshold of p < 0.005 (FDR corrected), extant threshold 
= 10 voxels.  
Whole-brain regression was also performed across target groups on the simple contrast 
[Pain > No Pain] using on-line empathy ratings and IRI scores as behavioral covariates with a 
threshold of p < 0.05, (FDR corrected), extant threshold = 10 voxels.  
Region of interest analyses were performed on a priori hypothesized regions-of-interest, 
specifically the dACC and bilateral AI, defined as a 6mm sphere centered on peak voxels from a 
previous study on empathy for emotional pain in people [dACC: -6, 14, 49; R AI: 39, 18, 2; L 
AI: -48, 14, -8 (Mathur et al., 2010)] with the MarsBar toolbox in SPM2 (Brett, Anton, 
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Valabregue, & Poline, 2002) (Figure 1).  MNI coordinates were converted into Talairach space 
using a non-linear transformation (http://imaging.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/imaging/MniTalairach). 
Brodmann areas and brain regions were identified based on the Talairach Atlas (Talairach & 
Tournoux, 1988). 
 
3 Results 
3.1 Behavioral results 
3.1.1 Analysis of variance 
Two separate 2 (valence of experience: Pain, Neutral) x 3 (target group: People, Animals, 
Nature) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on empathy ratings and response reaction 
time during scanning.   
3.1.1.1 Empathy ratings  
There were significant main effects of both valence of experience [F(1, 14) = 118.42, p < 
0.001], and target group [F(2, 28) = 9.35, p = 0.001] on empathy ratings.  There was also a 
significant interaction between valence and target group [F(2, 28) = 8.33, p = 0.001] such that all 
participants reported feeling more empathy toward pain relative to neutral scenes across target 
group [People: t (14) = 13.65, p < 0.001, d = 4.62; Animals: t (14) = 9.52, p < 0.001, d = 2.92; 
Nature: t (14) = 7.66, p < 0.001, d = 2.77], (Table 2), and people felt more relative empathy (Pain 
– Neutral) toward people [t (14) = 2.97, p =.01, d = 0.60] and animals [t (14) = 4.98, p < 0.001, d 
= 0.72] compared to nature.  However, there was no significant difference in empathy ratings 
toward people compared to animals [t (14) = -1.02, p = 0.33, d = -0.11]. 
3.1.1.2 Reaction time 
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 There were also significant main effects of valence of experience on reaction time [F(1, 
14) = 42.09, p < 0.001], such that all participants were slower to rate empathy for pain relative to 
neutral scenes across target group [People: t (14) = 2.88, p = 0.01, d = 0.61; Animals: t (14) = 
5.50, p < 0.001, d = 1.11; Nature: t (14) = 8.72, p < 0.001, d = 1.15]; and target group [F(2, 28) = 
9.18, p = 0.001], such that participants were slower to rate empathy for scenarios depicting 
people relative to animals [t (14) = 3.46, p = 0.004, d = 0.42] and nature [t (14) = 4.01, p = 0.001, 
d = 0.58] (Table 2).  There was also a significant interaction between valence and target group 
[F(2, 28) = 3.64, p = 0.04].  
3.1.1.3 Correlations 
 Relative empathy ratings (Pain – Neutral) were significantly correlated across domains (α 
= 0.88), such that participants who reported more empathy for people also did so for animals (R 
= 0.58, p = 0.02) and nature (R = 0.73, p = 0.002).  Similarly, when empathy for only pain 
scenarios was considered, this positive relationship between relative empathy for people and 
animals (R = 0.60, p = 0.02) and people and nature (R = 0.73, p = 0.002) remains. However, self-
reported empathy ratings were not associated with any IRI subscales. 
3.2 Neuroimaging results 
 
3.2.1 Main effect of pain 
 As expected, the main effect of pain recruited brain areas associated with the processing 
of pain and empathy.  Across participants and target groups, viewing and empathizing with 
painful scenarios was associated with activity in the dACC (extending to midcingulate cortex 
(aMCC) and supplementary motor area (SMA)3), bilateral AI, and thalamus. Because of the 
robustness of this activity when collapsing across target groups, we report the results for the 
main effect of pain at the more stringent threshold of p < 0.05 (FWE corrected), extant threshold 
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= 10 voxels (Table 3). 
3.2.1.1 People Pain > Neutral 
Consistent with prior research, the main effect of pain among human targets recruited 
brain areas associated with the processing of pain and empathy.  Across all participants, viewing 
people in emotionally painful scenarios, relative to people in neutral scenarios, was associated 
with increased activation in bilateral AI, dACC, and thalamus (Table 4, Figure 1).  These results 
are consistent with prior results of neural empathic response toward people in pain, and also 
provide independent replication of our prior results of neural reactivity in response to people in 
emotionally painful scenarios (Mathur et al., 2010). 
3.2.1.2 Animals Pain > Neutral 
 Witnessing animals in physically painful, relative to neutral, scenes was also associated 
with increased reactivity within the bilateral AI, dACC, and thalamus (Table 5, Figure 1). 
3.2.1.3 Nature Pain > Neutral 
 Witnessing harm being done to nature, relative to neutral nature scenes, was also 
associated with increased reactivity within the bilateral AI, dACC, and thalamus (Table 6, Figure 
1). 
3.2.2 Main effect of target group 
 A main effect of target group was only found when comparing animal scenes to nature 
scenes.  Regions of the bilateral inferior temporal and occipital gyri, including the bilateral 
fusiform, were more active when viewing scenes depicting animals relative to scenes depicting 
nature (Table S1).  No other main effects of target group were found. 
3.2.3 Interaction of pain and target group 
 No suprathreshold interactions between pain and target group were found. 
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3.2.4 Regression analysis 
 Whole-brain regression analyses using empathy ratings and IRI scores as covariates did 
not reveal suprathreshold clusters. 
3.2.5 Region of interest analysis 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a 2 (valence of experience: Pain, Neutral) x 3 
(target group: People, Animals, Nature) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on percent 
signal change within each of the a priori defined ROIs.   As expected, there was a main effect of 
valence within each ROI, such that the dACC and bilateral AI were more reactive when 
empathizing with pain, relative to neutral, scenes across all target groups [dACC: F(1, 14) = 
66.44, p < 0.001; L AI: F(1, 14) = 30.77, p < 0.001; R AI: F(1, 14) = 29.29, p < 0.001].   
Interestingly, there was no effect of target group on activity within regions of interest 
(Figure 1).  However, within the R AI, there was a significant interaction between valence and 
target group [F(2, 28) = 3.74, p = 0.04] such that the mean difference between pain and neutral R 
AI activity was smaller in response to human, relative to animal scenes [t (15) = 2.69, p = 0.02, d 
= 0.72].  This difference was driven by significantly greater R AI reactivity in response to neutral 
people, relative to neutral animal and nature, scenes [F(2, 28) = 3.46, p = 0.05]. There were no 
significant differences within the pain condition (all ps > 0.05). 
Activity within the ROIs in response to pain, relative to neutral, scenes was not 
significantly correlated with online empathy ratings or IRI total and subscale scores (all ps > 
0.05).  However, dACC and bilateral AI activity was significantly and positively correlated 
within each target domain (Table S2). 
 
4 Discussion 
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 The present results demonstrate overlapping neural representation underlying pain 
perceived in human and non-human entities, specifically animals and nature.  Our behavioral 
findings demonstrate that people report a negative affective response to not only the pain of other 
people, but also pain or harm of animals and nature.  Importantly, neural response within brain 
areas (e.g. dACC, bilateral AI) consistently associated with pain perception and empathy for the 
pain of other people was similar when responding to the pain or suffering perceived in animals or 
the natural environment.  This extends prior research that demonstrated overlapping dACC and 
bilateral AI activity in response to the pain of other people and the non-human species arguably 
most often empathized with by humans – dogs (Franklin et al., 2013). Hence, the current 
evidence lends support to our first hypothesis that the perception of pain and suffering relies 
upon a shared neural network for human and non-human entities.  Convergent support of this 
hypothesis comes from the strong association between participants’ subjective affective response 
toward humans, animals and nature in our study, suggesting a common psychological process 
underlying the perception of and response to the pain or harm of all three targets.  
One reason response to the pain or harm of non-human entities in the natural world may 
rely on processes associated with human pain perception and response is that both of these 
contexts signal a need for action, whether it be to rescue others or retreat from danger.  Empathy 
for people has long been understood as a key motivator of helping behavior (Batson et al., 1991; 
Preston & de Waal, 2002).  The perception-action model of empathy highlights the automaticity 
of this process and its relevance for survival of the species (Preston & de Waal, 2002).  
Similarly, perception and response to the pain or harm of animals and nature may also have had 
survival advantages for humans.  From the first year of life, people are exposed to cultural 
models of nature emphasizing an interdependent relation between humans and the surrounding 
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biological world (Bang, Medin, Atran, 2007; Hermann, Waxman, Medin, 2010). The cultivation 
and harvesting of, and general interdependence between humans, animals and the natural 
environment for survival also necessitated preserving these entities, which may have required the 
ability to identify harm or damage being caused to these targets and motivation to respond to 
alleviate such harm and damage.   
Another reason that pain perception for non-humans may rely upon a shared neural 
network may be due to an automatic process whereby people rely upon person perception 
processes and human-related empathic processing in order to empathize with non-humans (Epley, 
Waytz, and Cacioppo, 2007).  If this is an automatic or default processing strategy, then it may 
also result in preservation motives.  Others have suggested that the process of 
anthropomorphizing non-human entities may lead to treating those entities as moral agents 
worthy of respect and concern (Epley, Waytz, and Cacioppo, 2007).  Future studies should be 
conducted to tease apart whether the psychological process of anthropomorphizing non-human 
targets in pain or being harmed recruits the dACC and bilateral AI, or if this activity is relatively 
automatically recruited in response to such targets.  While it is possible that anthropomorphism 
is necessary for this pattern of activity in response to the pain or harm of non-humans, it is also 
possible that this common activity is what allows for the affective response to the pain or harm 
of various human and non-human targets, but that activity in other neural regions, such as medial 
prefrontal cortex or temporoparietal junction, may allow for the more cognitive process of 
attributing agency to non-human targets. Discovery of the independent predictive value of, as 
well as interactions between, these processes on helping behavior is also needed. Future studies 
that additionally examine brain responses related to “positive empathy” (Morelli, Lieberman, and 
Zaki, 2015) for humans and non-human species may shed light on these competing hypotheses 
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by determining the role of context (positive vs. negative) and target domain (human, animal, 
nature) on the degree of overlapping activations. For instance, if anthropomorphic processes 
underlie empathy for non-human entities, we would expect overlap in positive empathic response 
across target domains. 
Limitations of the present study include the lack of correlation between empathy ratings 
and dACC and AI activity, possibly because this activity may correspond to a more general 
psychological process such as the salience of the harmful scenes. Therefore, we more 
conservatively interpret this activity as neural response to the pain or harm of each target. 
Importantly, this neural response is routinely interpreted as the brain response to empathy. Future 
studies should aim to further explore the contribution of the dACC and AI to empathic 
processing, and whether, and in what ways, this activity differs from activity associated with 
perceiving and responding to harm or aversive scenes more generally. In response to reverse 
inferences being made about the function of the dACC and AI, others have argued that activation 
in these regions can be fully explained by stimuli saliency (Iannetti et al., 2013). It is possible 
that our results reflect a salience effect across domains. However, given the fundamental salience 
of human stimuli (Van Overwalle, 2009), if our observed results were due solely to salience 
effects, we would expect greater response to the human, relative to animal and nature, scenes. 
Nonetheless, follow up studies should control for the effects of salience differences across 
domains. Future studies should also extend this exploration to examine the neural and behavioral 
response to the destruction or damage of non-natural items which may also be salient and 
communicate threat, but may be less likely to evoke empathic response. It is also possible that 
assessing empathy toward non-human targets triggers empathic processes. However, prior 
research suggests that similar patterns of neural empathic responses are evoked when empathy is 
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explicitly assessed through similar instructions (e.g., Cheon et al., 2011; Mathur et al., 2010) , as 
well as when attention to the pain of human and animal targets is implicit or incidental (Cheon et 
al., 2013; Franklin et al., 2013). Therefore, it is unlikely that our results are contingent on task 
instruction. Finally, an important consideration is that our small sample size limits detection of 
significant differences. We chose a detection threshold optimized to avoid false-positive results, 
but cannot completely rule out the possibility of false-negative results. As such, we caution 
interpretation of non-significant main effects. Here we focus on the robust and novel finding that 
neural response within brain areas that have become known for their association with (and whose 
activation is often interpreted as) pain perception and empathy are recruited not only in response 
to the pain of other humans, but also to the perceived pain or harm of animals or the natural 
environment. The present study provides a foundation for future investigations into the nuanced 
differences in the neural response to these different target groups. 
This study offers new insights about the dACC and AI activity in response to the pain of 
other people.  Numerous prior studies have demonstrated activity within these regions to be 
associated with empathy toward the physical and emotional pain of other people, yet the 
specificity of this neural signature in the context of response to the pain of others is less well 
understood. Recent critiques have cautioned against assumptions and interpretations regarding 
the specificity of this activity within the dACC and AI (Decety, 2010; Schleim & Roiser, 2009).  
Research is needed to test the nature of this activity when responding to human and non-human 
targets in various situations, and whether involvement of this activity is associated with 
subjective empathic feelings, intensity of observed pain or harm, saliency of the harmful pictures, 
or some other factor. The present is a first study testing the neural response to the pain or harm of 
not just humans, but also animals and nature. The result of similar activity across target types 
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suggests that this activity is not as specific as the literature up to this point has assumed. We 
encourage readers to interpret the present results from this novel study as a first step. The finding 
that dACC and AI activity is similar when perceiving and responding to pain or harm of human, 
animal, and nature targets does not preclude the possibility that there are differences that were 
not detected with the current paradigm.  However, we believe the present results are particularly 
important given the novelty of the inclusion of various biological targets, and the recent surge of 
studies on the neuroscience of empathy. It is possible that 1) the neural empathic process is not 
specific to humans, and future studies should determine the bounds of this extension by using 
targets that vary on dimensions of similarity, mental capacity, value to humans, renewability and 
other hypothesized modulators; or 2) that the dACC and AI component of empathy is more 
promiscuous that previously thought and rather represents a more general process underlying 
empathy and the perception of harm. Rather than assuming specificity, future studies should test 
the component contribution of this network to empathy.   
One important consideration for future studies is to further explore the functional 
specificity of empathic neural circuitry. Prior studies have demonstrated the flexibility of this 
system in detecting salience in the external environment.  The present study demonstrates that 
empathy for human and non-human entities such as animals and nature evokes a similar brain 
response.  Hence, our findings suggest a general, rather than specific or human-centric, neural 
responding to perceived pain in one’s social and natural environment. More broadly, our findings 
may provide a foundation for future studies examining the extent to which activity within these 
regions relies on anthropomorphic thinking, or is simply an automatic affective response to 
harmful situations, as well as the role that empathic neural circuitry plays in facilitating broad 
charitable action for living things in the natural world.  
NEURAL RESPONSE TO PAIN OF PEOPLE, ANIMALS AND NATURE 
22 
 
Acknowledgements 
We thank A. Waytz, G. Bebko, L. Hechtman, and N. Pornpattananangkul for helpful 
feedback. 
 
 
NEURAL RESPONSE TO PAIN OF PEOPLE, ANIMALS AND NATURE 
23 
 
Abbreviations 
dACC – dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
AI - anterior insula 
ROI – region of interest 
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Footnotes 
1To refer to the egregiously negative situations thought to evoke empathic response, we use the 
term pain when referring to humans and harm when referring to animals and nature.  
2 We refer to the stimuli depicting the pain or harm of people, animals, and nature, as Pain, and 
the control stimuli as Neutral. 
3 Though we refer to this large cluster as dACC throughout based on the location of peak voxels, 
this cluster is large across stimulus domains and, similar to meta-analytic descriptions of 
empathy-related brain response (Fan et al., 2011), extends to include the anterior MCC and SMA. 
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Figure 1: Main effect of pain (Pain > Neutral), y = 20, p < 0.005 (FDR corrected), k = 10.  
Dotted circles outline a priori ROIs from which percent signal change was extracted. 
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Table 1: Behavioral validation experiment results 
 People Animals Nature 
 Pain Neutral Pain Neutral Pain Neutral 
Pain 5.00 ± 0.19* 0.45 ± 0.11 5.42 ± 0.29* 0.56 ± 0.11 4.76 ± 0.26* 0.46 ± 0.11 
Agency 2.66 ± 0.31* 4.64 ± 0.39 0.55 ± 0.22* 1.38 ± 0.31 0.88 ± 0.25 0.82 ± 0.26 
Empathy 4.81 ± 0.22* 0.33 ± 0.10 6.03 ± 0.13* 1.02 ± 0.20 4.49 ± 0.29* 0.42 ± 0.11 
Note: Ratings from 0 – 7; Mean ± SE; *, p < 0.05 when compared with the Neutral condition 
 
Table 2: Behavioral results 
 People Animals Nature 
 Pain Neutral Pain Neutral Pain Neutral 
Empathy 2.68 ± 0.13* 1.05 ± 0.02 2.86 ± 0.20* 1.08 ± 0.03 2.32 ± 0.17* 1.03 ± 0.01 
RT (ms) 914.26 ± 63.85* 774.61 ± 54.21 888.36 ± 74.16* 621.06 ± 47.42 837.95 ± 48.11* 623.95 ± 48.27 
Note: Ratings from 1-4; Mean ± SE; *, p < 0.05 when compared with the Neutral condition 
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Table 3. Main effect of pain: All target groups (Pain > Neutral) 
X Y Z Z score Voxels BA Brain area 
3 29 54 5.82 143 6, 8, 32 dACC 
0 -24 -11 5.7 187  Midbrain 
33 -60 -25 5.7 48  R Cerebellum 
-30 20 -9 5.48 43  L AI 
30 -50 -5 5.44 29 19 R Parahippocampal Gyrus 
36 23 -9 5.38 22  R AI 
12 -6 6 5.14 17  Thalamus 
  
                 p<0.05 (FWE corrected), k>10 
 
 
 
Table 4. Main effect of pain: People (Pain > Neutral) 
X Y Z Z score Voxels BA Brain area 
-30 23 -6 6.03 268 /47 L AI/Inferior Frontal Gyrus 
3 14 55 5.46 1045 32/6 dACC/Superior Frontal Gyrus 
12 -61 53 5.27 573 7 R Superior Parietal Lobule 
56 13 21 5.17 450 /45 R AI/Inferior Frontal Gyrus 
42 33 23 5.11 119 46 R Middle Frontal Gyrus 
-21 -73 -9 5.11 1067 18 L Lingual Gyrus 
-42 -84 10 5.07 171 19 L Middle Occipital Gyrus 
-12 0 8 5.03 617  L Thalamus/Putamen 
-33 5 36 4.96 307 9 L Precentral Gyrus 
-27 -71 45 4.96 134 7 L Superior Parietal Lobule 
50 -26 -4 4.86 58 21 R Superior Temporal Gyrus 
-30 3 52 4.75 108 6 L Middle Frontal Gyrus 
-9 -32 -3 4.74 71  L Cerebellum 
12 -30 -4 4.66 50  R Thalamus 
-36 56 8 4.46 73 10 L Middle Frontal Gyrus 
-27 -50 -3 4.34 47 19 L Parahippocampal Gyrus 
-45 46 -7 4.24 12 47 L Middle Frontal Gyrus 
21 59 22 4.23 37 10 R Superior Temporal Gyrus 
-36 -54 -28 4.06 27  L Cerebellum 
-3 57 39 3.91 22 9 L Middle Frontal Gyrus 
-39 -42 41 3.54 15 40 L Inferior Parietal Lobule 
  
        p<0.005 (FDR corrected), k>10 
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Table 5. Main effect of pain: Animals (Pain > Neutral) 
X Y Z Z score Voxels BA Brain area 
-6 -18 -9 5.4 4400  Bilateral thalamus/R AI 
-12 36 20 5.3 684 32 dACC 
27 -75 20 4.94 368 31 R Precuneus 
-33 23 -9 4.93 241  L AI 
-42 2 30 4.79 58 9 L Inferior Frontal Gyrus 
-30 -1 47 4.26 51 6 L Middle Frontal Gyrus 
39 54 22 4.19 44 10 R Superior Frontal Gyrus 
36 5 49 4.08 223 6 R Middle Frontal Gyrus 
0 -31 -36 3.93 22  Brainstem 
-33 51 25 3.79 14 9 L Superior Frontal Gyrus 
  
        p<0.005 (FDR corrected), k>10 
 
 
Table 6. Main effect of pain: Nature (Pain > Neutral) 
X Y Z Z score Voxels BA Brain area 
0 -29 1 5.25 198  Thalamus, Pulvinar 
-6 20 46 5.12 396 32/8 dACC/Medial Frontal Gyrus 
36 -60 -25 4.61 77  R Cerebellum 
-39 -66 -30 4.54 93  L Cerebellum 
50 15 10 4.52 10 /44 R AI/ Inferior Frontal Gyru 
-48 15 5 4.41 64 /44 L AI/Inferior Frontal Gyrus 
18 3 0 4.32 24  L Thalamus/Putamen 
0 -57 -35 4.21 14  L Cerebellum 
6 -28 29 4.16 21 23 R PCC 
42 17 -3 4.15 42  R AI 
36 -50 47 4.15 13 40 R Inferior Parietal Lobule 
  
 p<0.005 (FDR corrected), k>10 
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Table S1. Main effect of Agency: Animals (Pain + Neutral) > Nature (Pain + Neutral) 
X Y Z Z score Voxels BA Brain area 
45 -70 -2 5.68 276 19 R Inferior Temporal Gyrus 
-42 -82 -9 5.49 180 18 L Inferior Occipital Gyrus 
-42 -60 -17 4.35 24 37 L Fusiform Gyrus/Middle Occipital Gyrus 
45 -59 -17 4.21 20 37 R Fusiform Gyrus/Middle Occipital Gyrus 
  
           p<0.005 (FDR corrected), k>10 
 
 
 
Table S2: Neural Empathy Matrix Intercorrelation 
 People Animals Nature 
 dACC L AI dACC L AI dACC L AI 
dACC - - - - - - 
L AI .70** - .42† - .59* - 
R AI .55* .47† .82** .58* .83** .69** 
   R;†, p ≤ 0.10; *, p < 0.05; **, p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
